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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MEDIATION: 
BENEFITS GAINED, OPPORTUNITIES 
LOST 
CAROL B. LIEBMAN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, the United States healthcare system has begun to use 
mediation to facilitate communication between patients and physicians after an 
adverse medical event, to ease tensions among members of care-giving teams,1 
to resolve medical malpractice claims,2 and to help family members and medical 
professionals make awesome and wrenching decisions at the end of life.3 
Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 will 
produce new controversies and increase the need for mediation. Patients, 
families, physicians, nurses, other healthcare professionals, and administrators 
will require help managing the disagreements that arise as they adapt to the 
altered healthcare system. 
The Department of Health and Human Services understands this. The 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality recently announced seven grants 
as part of the Patient Safety and Medical Liability Initiative.4 Four grants, 
totaling $10 million, went to programs focusing on the interactions among 
patient safety goals, the litigation system, and physician–patient 
communication.5 Intelligent use of mediation and mediation skills can help us 
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achieve a safer and more efficient healthcare system. But for mediation’s 
potential benefits to be obtained, government officials and healthcare 
professionals must decide how conflict should be handled and what the role of 
lawyers should be when difficult physician–patient communications are 
required. The potential benefits from mediation are significant: improved 
patient safety; teamwork; relationship repair; and financial savings for 
physicians, hospitals, and patients. But achieving those benefits requires 
understanding of what recent scholarship has reported about successful and 
unsuccessful uses of mediation in the world of healthcare and sophisticated 
training of healthcare professionals, so that they can make informed decisions 
about when to use mediation and how to participate effectively in mediation. 
This article will review two recent studies evaluating the use of interest-
based mediation to resolve medical malpractice claims. The first studied cases 
brought against the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (the 
HHC study);6 the second, Mediating Suits against Hospitals (the MeSH study), 
studied cases brought against private New York City hospitals.7 The article will 
then consider how non-participation of physicians in mediations diminishes 
opportunities to achieve noneconomic goals that plaintiffs desire. 
II 
SUMMARY OF THE HHC AND MESH STUDIES 
A.  Overview of the HHC and MeSH Studies 
Both studies used an interest-based model of mediation to test whether 
mediation of medical malpractice cases can lead to economic benefits for the 
parties by reducing litigation costs and providing compensation sooner while 
promoting the sort of discussion that contributes to improved patient safety and 
repaired patient–physician relationships. The HHC study investigated 
mediation of cases brought against the New York City Health and Hospital 
Corporation.8 MeSH studied mediations of lawsuits against private hospitals in 
the New York City area.9 In the HHC study, the Health and Hospitals 
Corporation referred twenty-nine cases for mediation; in twenty-four cases, the 
lawyers agreed to mediation and nineteen cases were actually mediated. In the 
MeSH study, thirty-one cases, drawn from a pool of sixty-seven, referred 
 
 6. Chris Stern Hyman & Clyde B. Schecter, Mediating Medical Malpractice Suits Against 
Hospitals: New York City’s Pilot Project, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1394 (2006). 
 7. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 798. 
 8. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1394. 
 9. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 797–99. In both the MeSH and HHC 
studies, the defendants made the decision about which cases to refer to mediation. They were not 
explicit about their selection criteria. 
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lawsuits involving eleven non-profit hospitals in New York City, were 
mediated.10 
B.  Settlement Data 
In the HHC study, 68.4% (thirteen of nineteen) of the cases settled through 
mediation,11 while in the MeSH study, 70.6% (twenty-two of thirty-one) of the 
cases were settled as a result of mediation.12 In the HHC study, initially only 
cases with claims of $400,000 or below were selected for mediation. Halfway 
through the study, that limit was removed. The mean HHC settlement amount 
was $111,000 with a range of $17,500 to $400,000,13 while in the MeSH study, 
settlements were higher with a mean of $250,000 and a range of $35,000 to 
$1,700,000.14 
C.  Mediator Style 
Both studies used co-mediators and an interest-based model of mediation. 
A principle investigator co-mediated eighteen of the nineteen HHC 
mediations,15 and one of the two principle investigators co-mediated all but 
three of the MeSH cases.16 Because of the focus on the question of whether and 
how mediation might contribute to patient safety and improved quality of care, 
the other mediators in both studies were chosen for their comfort discussing 
highly emotional issues and their skill in helping participants explore a broad 
range of noneconomic issues. Mediation services were provided without charge 
in both studies. 
D.  Party Participation 
During pre-mediation conference calls with counsel, the mediators in the 
MeSH study pointed out the potential value to clients—both physicians and 
patients—of participation in the mediations. In the MeSH study, 80.6% 
 
 10. North Carolina medical malpractice mediations were the focus of a 1995 study which concluded 
that the “mediations” were “nothing more than a structured, traditional settlement conference 
conducted by a neutral third party.” The settlement rate in that study was 44.2% (eighty-seven of 197). 
Thomas B. Metzloff, Ralph A. Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, Empirical Perspectives on Mediation and 
Malpractice. 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 151, 137 (Winter 1997). A second article examined 
more of the 1995 North Carolina data regarding how the forty-six directly observed mediations were 
conducted. Ralph A. Peeples, Catherine. T. Harris & Thomas B. Metzloff, Following the Script: An 
Empirical Analysis of Court-Ordered Mediation of Medical Malpractice Cases, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 101 
(2007). 
 11. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1395. 
 12. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 807. In the MeSH study, sixteen cases 
settled at mediation (sixty-eight percent), another five settled afterward at amounts discussed during 
the mediation, and three cases settled after the mediation had been scheduled but before it took place. 
 13. Initially, only cases with claims of $400,000 or below were sent to mediation in the HHC study. 
Midway through the study, that cap was lifted. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1395. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 806. 
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(twenty-five of thirty-one) of the plaintiffs attended the mediations,17 but not a 
single physician attended. In the HHC study, it was known from the outset that 
physicians would not participate. In that study, 84% (sixteen of nineteen) of the 
plaintiffs attended the mediations.18 
E.  Participants’ Assessment of the Mediations 
 Most of the plaintiffs who attended the mediations in both studies found it a 
positive experience.19 Using a five-point scale with a score of one being the most 
positive, MeSH plaintiffs rated the mediation process and their experience 
during the actual mediation at a mean of 1.98,20 while the HHC plaintiffs gave 
mediation a mean rating of 2.22.21 Attorneys also rated their experience in the 
mediations positively. For many, this was their first experience with interest-
based mediation.22 Unlike the plaintiff participants, many MeSH attorneys 
(eighty percent of the defense lawyers and forty-two percent of the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys) had previous experience in mediation.23 They gave their MeSH 
experience a mean score of 1.9.24 In the HHC study, the City was represented by 
a single attorney who had not previously participated in a mediation; her 
positive experience is reported in an article in the New York Law Journal.25 The 
HHC study lawyers gave the mediation process a mean rating of 1.95 and rated 
the results of the mediation at 2.56.26 
A few of the MeSH lawyers would have preferred an evaluative approach to 
mediation. Five of nineteen plaintiff’s lawyers and three of sixteen defense 
lawyers were critical of the mediators’ non-evaluative approach,27 and one felt 
the process was inefficient because of the amount of time the plaintiff was 
allowed to speak.28 
As Hyman et al. report, in the MeSH study, 
 
 17. Id. at 807. 
 18. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1397. 
 19. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 802–03. In the MeSH study, research 
assistants asked all participants in post-mediation telephone interviews questions designed to measure 
their satisfaction with the mediation process. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1397. For a detailed analysis of party response to eight 
questions in a post-mediation interview that measured their attitudes toward the mediation process, see 
Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 803–04. 
 22. See Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 818. 
 23. Id. 
 24. In twenty cases, either an insurance representative or a hospital representative also attended 
the mediation. They rated their experience at a mean of 2.5 with no significant difference between the 
two groups. Six relatives of the plaintiffs also attended the mediation. Id. at 809–10. 
 25. Amy G. London, Mediation Offers Promise, But No Cure for System’s Ills, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 16, 
2006. 
 26. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1396. 
 27. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 818–19. 
 28. Id. at 815. 
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Attorneys, especially on the defense side, showed some reluctance to try mediation 
despite the considerable financial benefit to their clients of avoiding or limiting trial 
preparation and trial. In theory, decisions about whether or not to mediate should be 
made jointly by lawyers and clients (ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
2006). As a practical matter, attorneys act as gatekeepers, either making on their own 
the decision whether to mediate and whether clients will attend and participate or 
heavily influencing clients’ choices.29 
F.  Time Savings 
Both studies found that mediation was time-efficient. In the HHC study, 
lawyers estimated that they spent approximately one-tenth as much time 
preparing for mediation as for litigation.30 In the MeSH study, lawyers reported 
three to ten hours of preparation for mediation (median six hours), contrasted 
with estimates of 100 hours that would be needed for trial preparation.31 
G.  Discovery 
While discovery was completed in ten of twenty MeSH cases and partially 
completed in eight others, there was no correlation between the stage in 
litigation and the likelihood of settlement.32 Seventy percent of the cases where 
discovery had been completed settled at mediation and seventy-five percent of 
those with partial discovery settled.33 
III 
BENEFITS GAINED 
The MeSH and HHC studies show that mediation can save transaction 
costs, give plaintiffs the opportunity to be heard, and allow defendants to obtain 
information that might improve the quality of care. But the decision not to have 
physicians participate in the mediation minimized the last benefit. While the 
overwhelming majority of cases settle before trial,34 most do so late in the 
litigation process, on the proverbial courthouse steps. If parties make increased 
use of mediation to reach settlement closer in time to the adverse event, 
defendants will realize significant savings in litigation costs, plaintiffs will 
receive compensation sooner and when they may need it most, and plaintiffs’ 
lawyers will still receive adequate compensation for their work. As argued in 
previous articles, 
While risk managers and lawyers need to gather information in order to value a 
malpractice claim, the amount of information needed to guide a settlement 
negotiation is not as great as the amount required to prove a case at trial. Early 
 
 29. Id. at 813. 
 30. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1394. 
 31. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 812–13. 
 32. Id. at 809. 
 33. Id. at 812. 
 34. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: What the Numbers Tell Us, What They May Mean, DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Summer 2004, at 3. 
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mediation offers the opportunity for patients to receive compensation soon after the 
event and for defendants (and to a lesser extent plaintiffs) to avoid the financial costs 
of prolonged discovery. Early settlement also spares patients and physicians a brutal 
and emotionally draining discovery process. In addition, when there is only a short gap 
in time between the harm and the mediation, information that might suggest a need 
for changed procedures is more likely to seem salient and lead to improved patient 
safety.35 
Of course, early mediation will not always be appropriate. Sometimes it 
takes time for the long-term consequences of an injury to be clear. In other 
cases where defendants are certain that care was appropriate, they may not be 
willing to make an offer. Even in those cases, both sides may benefit from 
giving the plaintiffs the opportunity to be heard and explaining to the 
defendants what happened and why, especially if communication between the 
caregivers and the patient or patient’s family has been poor. Finally, early 
mediation may not be appropriate when there is a suspicion of a cover-up. 
Participants in the MeSH study reported some noneconomic benefits as 
well: the opportunity for a relative to speak about what had happened (the 
mother of a child with Erb’s palsy),36 for the plaintiff to tell her story in a 
professional setting (a defense lawyer commenting on mediation of case 
brought by a breast cancer surgery patient who suffered complications from 
intravenous (IV) chemotherapy infusion),37 and for a plaintiff to understand the 
other side’s perspective on the case (plaintiff’s lawyer discussing the impact of 
mediation in a contaminated platelets wrongful death action).38 In addition, in 
the MeSH study, in four instances, hospital representatives reported they had 
obtained information from the mediation that might lead them to suggest 
changes in policy.39 
IV 
OPPORTUNITIES LOST 
While twenty-five plaintiffs participated in the thirty-one MeSH mediations, 
and sixteen in the nineteen HHC mediations, not a single physician took part.40 
When defendant physicians do not participate in mediations, those physicians, 
the defendant hospitals, the plaintiff patients and families, and the general 
population of patients all lose. Non-participation of defendant physicians leads 
to a loss of the opportunity for patients and physicians to reconcile, loss of the 
opportunity for the physician to be forgiven and for the patient or family to 
forgive, loss of the opportunity for the physician and family members to forgive 
themselves, loss of the opportunity for information giving and gathering, and 
loss of the opportunity to consider changes in institutional policies and 
 
 35. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 813. 
 36. Id. at 811. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 823. 
 40. Id. at 807; Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1396. 
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practices. When physicians are not included in the mediation, they are also 
deprived of “voice, representation and participation,” key elements in what 
procedural-justice scholars have identified as critical to a process being 
perceived as fair.41 
There is a known mismatch between what patients and families want 
following a medical error and the way physicians communicate after such 
events. Patients and family members want to receive a detailed explanation of 
what happened and why it happened, want to know how the problem will be 
corrected and future errors prevented, and want to receive an apology.42 They 
also want reassurance about the medical and, ultimately, financial 
consequences.43 These findings about patient and family goals after an adverse 
medical event are consistent with procedural-justice research, which finds that 
litigants are often after more than winning or losing or money, instead 
evaluating their experience in the courts in terms of criteria such as 
“vindication, attention, accountability, information, accuracy, comfort, respect, 
recognition, dignity, efficacy, empowerment, [and] justice.”44 
However, “when unexpected clinical outcomes occur . . . [p]hysicians 
frequently avoid conversations with the patient and patient’s family about what 
occurred, rarely apologize or explain the steps that will be taken to prevent 
recurrence of the harm, and vary widely in the type and amount of information 
they disclose.”45 And while there is a clear trend toward greater disclosure as a 
matter of ethics, institutional policy, and regulation,46 other studies show that 
implementing new policies is difficult and actual rates of disclosure remain low. 
Another equally troubling mismatch is that between attorneys’ perceptions 
of their clients’ goals in medical malpractice litigation and the goals actually 
reported by plaintiffs. An important and insufficiently noted work by Tamara 
Relis47 found that lawyers for both defendants and plaintiffs believe that 
 
 41. Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A 
Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 486 (2010); see also id. at 486 n.38. 
 42. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully: How Physicians Would Disclose 
Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1585, 1585–93 (2006). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Zimerman & Tyler, supra note 41, at 482 (quoting Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the 
Aggregate: Relationships, Representations, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 364 (1996)). 
 45. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 800 (citing Lauris C. Kaldjian et al., 
Disclosing Medical Errors to Patients: Attitudes and Practices of Physicians and Trainees, 22 J. 
INTERNAL MED. 988 (2007); Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National 
Survey, 22 HEALTH AFF. 73 (2003); Gallagher et al., supra note 42). 
 46. Joint Comm’n on Accreditation of Healthcare Org., Ethics, Rights, and Responsibilities, in 
COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK (2003), 
Standard RI.1.2.2, [which went into effect on July 1, 2001]; AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND 
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS § 8.12 
(1994); DOUG WOJCIESZAK ET AL., SORRY WORKS! DISCLOSURE, APOLOGY, AND RELATIONSHIPS 
PREVENT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (2007). 
 47. TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, DEFENDANTS, 
PLAINTIFFS, AND GENDERED PARTIES (2009). Relis gathered data through 131 interviews, 
observations, and questionnaires of participants in sixty-four Canadian “fatality and medical injury 
LIEBMAN 4/6/2011   
142 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:135 
plaintiffs are primarily after money when they sue. Ninety percent of the 
physicians’ lawyers thought that money was a plaintiff’s sole goal, while only ten 
percent recognized plaintiffs’ desires for answers.48 Relis found that hospital 
lawyers also saw money as plaintiffs’ primary goal (67%) but did recognize 
other interests including: (1) obtaining answers (25%), (2) acknowledgment of 
harm (25%), (3) either vindication or justice (17%), (4) blame (17%), and (5) 
prevention of reoccurrence (8%).49 Eight percent of the hospital lawyers 
thought money was only a secondary goal.50 Plaintiffs’ lawyers’ views had more 
in common with the views of other lawyers than with those of their clients. 
Sixty-seven percent (the same percent as hospital lawyers) thought the primary 
goal of plaintiffs was to obtain money,51 but they also recognized other goals: (1) 
obtaining answers (50%), (2) retribution (33%), (3) acknowledgment of harm 
(28%), (4) accepting responsibility (17%), (5) apology (17%), (6) to be sure the 
harm never happens again (6%), and (7) either revenge or punishment (6%).52 
Twenty-two percent of the plaintiffs’ lawyers saw money as a secondary goal of 
their clients. 
Plaintiffs in the Relis study tell a very different story. For them, it is 
principles that matter and not money.53 Plaintiffs reported that their primary 
goal in suing was to get an admission of fault or responsibility (59%). An 
additional 59% sued to ensure that the harm never occurred again. Fifty-three 
percent sought answers, 41% retribution, and 41% apology. Thirty-five percent 
named money as a secondary goal, 35% wanted an acknowledgement of harm, 
and 24% sought punishment. Only 18% stated that money was their primary 
goal and a mere 6% stated that money was their only goal.54 Forty-one percent 
did not mention money as a goal.55 
Relis explains these results as follows: 
[I]n assisting disputants to understand their cases and what can be done about them, 
lawyers as gatekeepers to legal institutions virtually always transform disputes. . . . 
[L]itigants’ experiences and extralegal aims are translated, reconstituted, and coerced 
 
cases,” the equivalent to medical malpractice cases in the United States. Even though, by law, 
defendants were required to be present for the mediation, they usually were not. The requirement was 
avoided by having the lawyers, the plaintiff (if present), and the mediator agree to go forward without 
the participation of the defendant. Id. at 87. In the sample, the defendant physicians rarely attended a 
mediation. While the Canadian healthcare and tort systems differ in significant ways from those in the 
United States—including a single payer healthcare system, court-imposed limits on some categories of 
damages, provincial government reimbursement of part of physicians’ malpractice insurance payments, 
a single rate for insurance regardless of physician specialty, and an aggressive approach to defense of 
claims by CMPA—her data is nonetheless instructive. 
 48. Id. at 37 fig.1. 
 49. Id. at 38 fig.2. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 40. 
 52. Id. at 40 fig.3. 
 53. Id. at 42. 
 54. Id. at 43 fig.4. 
 55. Id. 
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by lawyers to fit into legal and monetary compartments, ignoring aspects deemed 
irrelevant in law and ultimately translating them into money.56 
Relis identifies four reasons for the differences in plaintiff and lawyer 
identification of plaintiffs’ goals: 
1. Lawyers focus on money damages because they are trained “to 
operate according to rights and rules, applying law to facts and 
placing people and occurrences into legal categories including 
damages.”57 
2. In response to the legal system’s limited ability to deal with human 
and emotional needs, lawyers react to what Relis calls “system 
conditioning,” redefining and lowering their expectations for what 
they can expect the legal system to offer their clients.58 
3. In the process of translating and transforming their clients’ 
litigation goals, plaintiffs’ lawyers may also be reinforcing their own 
limited views of those goals.59 
4. As a result of translating and transforming goals in communication 
with their clients, plaintiffs’ lawyers reinforce their own views and 
may, as a result, stress only limited economic goals in discussions 
with defense counsel. Since the defense side only communicates 
indirectly with the plaintiff through their lawyers, they never hear 
about any other goals.60 
In the MeSH study, lawyers explained their decisions not to bring physicians 
to the mediation by pointing to their clients’ busy schedules or saying that they 
wanted to avoid having their clients hear plaintiffs’ attacks or that it was not the 
usual practice.61 The Relis study also found that lawyers sought to avoid 
emotional confrontations by mediating without their clients. Those lawyers also 
felt—consistent with their view that the litigation was only about money—that 
physicians were not needed at the mediation and that their presence would not 
aid in settlement since insurance companies, and not the physicians, make the 
final decision about settlement amounts. 
Some of the lawyers in the Relis study did see unfocused potential gains 
from having defendant physicians participate.62 Forty-four percent of the 
physicians’ lawyers said that physician participation might be helpful to 
plaintiffs and sixty-seven percent thought their clients would benefit personally 
and that the nonfinancial issues were important to their clients. Even so, they 
 
 56. Id. at 53 (see n.18 for sources cited). 
 57. Id. at 62. 
 58. Id. at 62–63. Relis calls this “dispute translation.” 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 817. 
 62. RELIS, supra note 47, at 93. 
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did not bring their physician clients to mediation. Perhaps, as Relis notes, these 
decisions resulted from the defense lawyers’ view of the physician’s irrelevance 
to settlement, with only twenty-two percent thinking that having the doctors at 
the mediation table would help settlement.63 Plaintiffs’ lawyers tended to have 
views similar to those of the defense lawyers: they recognized the importance of 
noneconomic issues to the clients, but, on the whole, also saw the defendants’ 
presence as irrelevant since the physicians were not involved in the monetary 
decisions. It is possible that some lawyers feared that the defendant physicians’ 
anger and upset feeling at being sued or lack of communication skills might lead 
to unproductive discussions during the mediation. Although, in most cases, 
mediators, through process management, coaching, and modeling are able to 
guide participant communication in a productive direction, occasionally, 
aggressive or offensive behavior by a mediation participant can either decrease 
the likelihood of settlement or drive up settlement costs. In the MeSH study, 
lawyers “did not seem to consider the physicians’ own emotional needs after a 
patient has been harmed by medical care and the possibility that participation 
might have been helpful to a physician coping with feelings of guilt or 
remorse.”64 In dramatic contrast with the responses of all of the attorney groups, 
100% of the seventeen plaintiffs and twelve defendant physicians interviewed in 
the Relis study said that the doctors should attend the mediation. The 
physicians recognized the value of attendance to the doctor, to the plaintiff, and 
for learning information that can contribute to improving the quality of care.65 
In Relis’s plaintiff group, 76% thought attendance would be beneficial for the 
physicians, 94% for the plaintiffs, and 53% for learning. Twenty-nine percent of 
the plaintiffs and 64% of the defendant physicians thought physician presence 
would aid in settlement.66 In the MeSH study, twenty-five percent of the 
plaintiffs mentioned their frustration at the lack of communication with their 
physicians after the event,67 a problem that could have been remedied had the 
physicians attended the mediation. 
The views of mediators in the Relis study were consistent with the desires of 
the parties. Most of the mediators in her study thought that the non-
participation of the defendant physicians made it more difficult to settle.68 
The quest of patients and, moreso, of surviving family members for answers 
to their questions about what happened to their loved ones is well and often 
 
 63. Id. at 95. 
 64. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 817 (citing Michael Rowe, Doctors’ 
Responses to Medical Errors, 52 CRITICAL REVIEWS IN ONCOLOGY/HEMOTOLOGY 147 (2004); Albert 
W. Wu et al., To Tell the Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in Disclosing Medical Mistakes to Patients, 
12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 770 (1997)). 
 65. RELIS, supra note 47, at 104–09. 
 66. Id. at 105 fig.11. 
 67. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 820. 
 68. RELIS, supra note 47, at 94 fig.9. 
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painfully documented.69 In mediation, patients and their families may finally 
obtain the information they have been seeking. Moreover, if a physician or 
other clinician participates, he or she might provide a comprehensive 
explanation of complex and uncertain medical situations rather than the often 
fragmented communication that too often occurs in a hospital where a number 
of busy nurses and physicians and other clinicians may be involved in a given 
case with each assuming the others have taken time to communicate with the 
patient or family.70 
Without a physician or other person responsible for, and knowledgeable 
about, patient care at the table, mediation will not lead to improved quality of 
care because information with clinical significance may be overlooked or given 
too little attention. For patient safety to benefit, someone is needed at the table 
who has technical clinical knowledge, appreciation for the institution’s 
culture—who are the power players, who makes decisions and has influence—
and who has an understanding of policy and procedures. 
In a number of mediations, it has been clear that, especially after a death, 
family members blame themselves for not doing more—not asking more 
questions, not getting their loved one to the hospital sooner, not spending more 
time at the bedside.71 The traditional adversarial defense of claims only 
heightens their guilt and their grief. Information and, when appropriate, 
assumption of responsibility for error by the medical team can provide release 
for family members and allow them to forgive themselves for failing to prevent 
a tragic outcome. 
In one MeSH mediation, the behavior of the defense lawyer damaged the 
possibility of settlement, may have increased the costs of settlement, and was 
perceived by the plaintiff as an additional offense. His failure to adopt behavior 
appropriate to mediation and his aggressive approach led the plaintiff’s lawyer 
to label his decision to have his client attend as “a foolish mistake. I should not 
have put my clients through that. . . . [T]he defense lawyers lacked any 
sympathy, were abusive, and said things that are now torturing my clients.”72 
Other opportunities to satisfy plaintiffs’ goals were missed when defense 
attorneys in two MeSH cases identified changes in procedures that might help 
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avoid repetition of the harm. They chose not to share that information with the 
plaintiffs, thus frustrating one of the goals that plaintiffs often cite: avoiding the 
same harm happening to other patients. In some cases, the lawyers were 
apparently not oriented toward those sorts of concerns. In four cases, mediators 
identified changes in practices that might prevent future harm which were not 
identified by the lawyers for either side.73 
Several recent articles have explored the possible negative impact of lawyers 
in mediation. Poitras et al.,74 in an empirical study, examined seven ways in 
which attorney participation in mediation might have a negative impact on: (1) 
settlement rates, (2) the length of time spent in mediation, (3) the parties’ view 
of mediator effectiveness, (4) the clients’ view of whether the mediation was 
fair, (5) the clients’ satisfaction with a mediated agreement, (6) parties’ trust 
that the other side will abide by the mediation agreement, and (7) party 
reconciliation. They found that attorney participation had no impact on the 
settlement rate, minimal impact on the amount of time spent in mediation (on 
average, mediations lasted thirty minutes longer when attorneys participated), 
and no difference in parties’ view of mediation fairness, party satisfaction with 
the agreement, or parties’ belief that the agreement would be followed. The 
areas in which attorney participation did make a difference were the parties’ 
evaluation of mediator helpfulness and whether or not parties reconciled. The 
authors speculated that the negative impact of attorney presence on 
reconciliation may be the result of lawyers’ tendencies to focus on legal rather 
than interpersonal matters, to advise their clients not to apologize, and to 
substitute their voice for that of their clients by speaking for their clients.75 
The authors suggest several strategies to control the negative impact of 
lawyers on reconciliation between the parties. These include: (1) spending more 
time prior to the mediation educating the attorneys about the process and how 
to use it effectively76 (an attempt that was not particularly successful in the 
MeSH study77), (2) specifically stating in mediation agreements that apologies or 
statements of regret that an event occurred will be protected78 (some literature 
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suggests that apologies which receive this type of protection have less value),79 
and (3) encouraging the parties to speak to each other directly.80 
It seems clear that the nonparticipation of physicians in the mediation 
destroys any chance for patients and physicians to reconcile. It also deprives 
patients of the opportunity to know that the physician involved cares enough 
about the bad outcome to come and sit with the patient or family in the 
mediation. Patients interpret nonparticipation as an indication of indifference, 
lack of respect, and shirking of responsibility. 
In one MeSH case for wrongful death,81 a patient was admitted to the 
hospital with multiple co-morbidities, developed sepsis (system wide infection), 
and remained in the hospital for six months steadily wasting away despite the 
efforts of the medical team. She died two weeks after being transferred by the 
family to another hospital. The story that the plaintiffs’ lawyers had 
developed—their theory of the case—was that the defendant hospital had 
neglected the patient and, in the words of the plaintiff’s daughter and her 
lawyer, “allowed her to starve to death.”82 The hospital was represented by its 
lawyer. No physician or other representative of the hospital attended the 
mediation. In the course of the discussion, an alternative version of the story 
became apparent to the mediators—that the hospital had continued to fight for 
the patient and against her diseases for an extraordinarily long period and, 
despite this fight, it was the disease that ultimately killed her. The mediators 
raised this possible alternative narrative and it seemed to give some relief to the 
daughter. Imagine how much more credible and comforting it would have been 
to have a physician at the table to describe the fight, the complexities and 
difficulties of this case, the frustration of seeing treatment after treatment fail, 
and the healthcare team members’ sadness at the death of the patient. In 
addition, the physician might have heard from the daughter about ineffective 
communication with the family—a breakdown that ultimately led to total lack 
of trust and the transfer.83 
It is unfortunate, but understandable, that physicians do not act on their 
realization of the potential benefit of their participation in mediation. One 
reason is obvious—most people are conflict-averse and try to avoid difficult 
conversations. With lawyers discouraging mediation participation, physicians 
are happy to have a reason to avoid a difficult discussion. Jay Hoecker, 
discussing the underrepresentation of physicians at a conference on Alternative 
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Dispute Resolution (ADR),84 points out that physicians are scientists and 
scientists base action on data.85 The studies of medical malpractice mediation 
discussed above are beginning attempts to provide data about the efficacy of an 
approach different from the deny-and-defend tradition that will lead to 
increased physician participation. Hoecker also argues that employer 
institutions are more likely than individual physicians to accept the use of 
ADR86 for so long as those processes are seen as an extension of the legal 
system rather than integral to quality patient care.87 However, discussions with 
individual physicians frustrated by instructions from their insurers to take an 
adversarial, non-communicative approach toward their patients suggest that, 
with a bit of organizing, a change might come just as easily from the ground up 
as from the top down. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers discourage their physician clients from participation in mediation 
for a number of reasons. First, they may be trying to protect their clients from 
what certainly would be an emotionally trying, even if ultimately satisfying, 
experience. Second, they see mediation as part of the legal system and, lacking 
knowledge and understanding of the full range of benefits of mediation, have a 
constricted vision of what is possible or productive in mediation. Third, their 
experience with evaluative mediators may have blinded them to the 
noneconomic benefits for their clients of client participation. Fourth, they may 
fear either that their clients might say something that damages the legal case or 
that offends the plaintiffs. Finally, given the fact that most defense counsel are 
paid on an hourly basis, some may be hostile to a process that offers less 
expensive resolution. 
Sending a litigator to settle a case may make as much sense as asking a 
surgeon to provide holistic noninvasive medical care. Litigators, whose advice 
about communication with patients and their families and approach to client 
participation in mediation seems so flawed, may only be doing their job—that 
is, shaping all client interactions with the opposing side with an eye to the 
impact on the legal case. Of course, this is a narrow definition of the lawyer’s 
job and typifies the often criticized defend and deny mentality—most recently 
seen in the British Petroleum disaster and Toyota malfunction—which fosters 
mistrust. Toyota was widely criticized for its decision to withhold information 
about possible problems with the gas pedal. Former Merrill Lynch media 
relations executive, Eddie Reeves, said of that response, “People are 
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reasonable. They know companies make mistakes, and people will forgive an 
honest mistake. They will not forgive a dishonest cover-up.”88 
In both law and medicine, people turn to educated and trained professionals 
for help with problems—often serious problems. Also, in both law and 
medicine, individuals are dependent on institutions—hospitals and courts—with 
their own traditions, cultures, and hierarchies. Beginning with the anti-
paternalistic patients’ rights movement of the 1960s, patients have become more 
involved in their own care (even if at times producing a suspicious vigilance not 
always good for a patient’s mental state or the physician–patient relationship). 
Patient involvement has been increased by readily available medical 
information on the internet. 
Interestingly, there is no similar movement in law, except perhaps recently 
among high-end consumers of legal services where post-recession attitudes 
about how much clients are willing to pay and for what may be changing. The 
difference in the development of patients’ active, questioning approach to 
healthcare and the passive approach of many defendant physicians may result 
from the fact that most malpractice clients are single or only few-time players 
compared to patients who are regular and, in many cases, constant consumers 
of medical care. Medical malpractice plaintiffs are unlikely to be involved in 
repeat litigation, so they are less likely to understand the system well enough to 
insist to their lawyers that the mediation not proceed without physician 
participation. But many defendant healthcare institutions—hospitals, nursing 
homes, and group practices—are repeat players. It is interesting to think about 
ways that those defendants might learn from the patients’ rights movement in 
their selection of, instructions to, and collaboration with their lawyers. 
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